Political preference formation: Competition, deliberation, and the (Ir)relevance of framing effects
Political preference formation: Competition, deliberation, and the (Ir)relevance of framing effects
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DOI：
10.1017/s0003055404041413
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发表时间：
2004-11-01
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
Druckman, JN
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Druckman, JN
社会科学中最有争议的问题之一是人们的行为是否理性。大量的研究都假设个人确实会做出理性的经济、政治和社会决策。然而，数以百计的实验表明，情况并非如此。框架效应构成了非理性最令人震惊和最有影响力的证明之一。这些影响不仅挑战了许多社会科学的基本假设（例如，存在一致的偏好或稳定的态度），但也导致许多学者采用替代方法（例如，前景理论）。令人惊讶的是，几乎没有工作试图指定的政治条件下，框架效应发生我填补了这一空白，提供了一个理论和实验测试。我展示了背景力量（例如，精英竞争，审议）和个人属性（例如，（1）影响到成功的因素。这些结果提供了对合理性假设适用的洞察，并且对政治心理学和实验方法具有广泛的影响。
One of the most contested questions in the social sciences is whether people behave rationally. A large body of work assumes that individuals do in fact make rational economic, political, and social decisions. Yet hundreds of experiments suggest that this is not the case. Framing effects constitute one of the most stunning and influential demonstrations of irrationality. The effects not only challenge the foundational assumptions of much of the social sciences (e.g., the existence of coherent preferences or stable attitudes), but also lead many scholars to adopt alternative approaches (e.g., prospect theory). Surprisingly, virtually no work has sought to specify the political conditions under which framing effects occur I fill this gap by offering a theory and experimental test. I show how contextual forces (e.g., elite competition, deliberation) and individual attributes (e.g., expertise) affect the success of framing. The results provide insight into when rationality assumptions apply and, also, have broad implications for political psychology and experimental methods.