Improving Sequential Single-Item Auctions
Improving Sequential Single-Item Auctions
复制标题
改进单品顺序拍卖
DOI：
10.1109/iros.2006.282567
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
C. Tovey
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Xiaoming Zheng;Sven Koenig;C. Tovey
我们研究如何改进连续的单物品拍卖，将目标分配给机器人执行探索任务，如环境清理、空间探索和搜救任务。我们利用了这样的见解，即如果竞标和赢家确定规则被设计为导致爬山，即在顺序的单物品拍卖的每一轮中为机器人分配额外的目标，则产生的旅行距离很小，从而使团队成本增加最少。我们研究了增加爬山的前瞻性和使用滚动来改善对部分目标分配的评估的影响。我们描述了由此产生的顺序单一物品拍卖的竞价和赢家确定规则，并对它们进行了实验评估，得出了令人惊讶的结果：较大的抬头并不能可靠地改善连续单一物品拍卖，而在早期几轮中只有少量的推出已经显著改善了它们
We study how to improve sequential single-item auctions that assign targets to robots for exploration tasks such as environmental clean-up, space-exploration, and search and rescue missions. We exploit the insight that the resulting travel distances are small if the bidding and winner-determination rules are designed to result in hillclimbing, namely to assign an additional target to a robot in each round of the sequential single-item auction so that the team cost increases the least. We study the impact of increasing the lookahead of hillclimbing and using roll-outs to improve the evaluation of partial target assignments. We describe the bidding and winner-determination rules of the resulting sequential single-item auctions and evaluate them experimentally, with surprising results: larger lookaheads do not improve sequential single-item auctions reliably while only a small number of roll-outs in early rounds already improve them substantially