Approval mechanism to solve prisoner’s dilemma: comparison with Varian’s compensation mechanism
Approval mechanism to solve prisoner’s dilemma: comparison with Varian’s compensation mechanism
复制标题
解决囚徒困境的审批机制：与瓦里安补偿机制的比较
DOI：
10.1007/s00355-017-1107-z
复制
发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Masuda Takehito and Yamakawa Takafumi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Saijo Tatsuyoshi;Masuda Takehito and Yamakawa Takafumi
在玩过囚徒困境之后，参与者可以同意或拒绝对方的合作或背叛选择。如果两个参与人都同意对方的选择，那么结果就是囚徒困境中所选择的策略的结果;然而，如果其中一个参与人拒绝了另一个参与人的选择，那么结果就和他们都从囚徒困境中叛逃了一样。在理论上，这样的批准机制实现了弱劣势策略向后淘汰的合作，尽管在子博弈完美纳什均衡中并非如此。相比之下，瓦里安提出的补偿机制（Am Econ Rev 84（5）：1278-1293，1994）在后者中实现了合作，但在前者中没有实现。这一结果激发了目前对这两种机制的实验研究。批准机制会话在第一阶段的合作率为90%，跨阶段为93.2%，而补偿机制会话在第一阶段的合作率为63.3%，跨阶段为75.2%。此外，弱劣势策略的后向淘汰比子博弈完美纳什均衡在两个机制会话中更好地预测受试者的行为。
After having played a prisoner’s dilemma, players can approve or reject the other’s choice of cooperation or defection. If both players approve the other’s choice, the outcome is the result of the chosen strategies in the prisoner’s dilemma; however, if either rejects the other’s choice, the outcome is the same as if they had mutually defected from the prisoner’s dilemma. In theory, such an approval mechanism implements cooperation in backward elimination of weakly dominated strategies, although this is not the case in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. By contrast, the compensation mechanism proposed by Varian (Am Econ Rev 84(5):1278–1293, 1994) implements cooperation in the latter but not in the former. This result motivates the present experimental study of the two mechanisms. The approval mechanism sessions yield a cooperation rate of 90% in the first period and 93.2% across periods, while the compensation mechanism sessions yield a cooperation rate of 63.3% in the first period and 75.2% across periods. In addition, the backward elimination of weakly dominated strategies better predicts subjects’ behavior than does the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in both mechanism sessions.