What does the interactive brain hypothesis mean for social neuroscience? A dialogue
What does the interactive brain hypothesis mean for social neuroscience? A dialogue
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DOI：
10.1098/rstb.2015.0379
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发表时间：
2016-05-05
影响因子：
6.3
通讯作者：
Adolphs, Ralph
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
De Jaegher, Hanne;Di Paolo, Ezequiel;Adolphs, Ralph
受现象学哲学、动力系统理论、具身认知和机器人学的启发，最近提出了交互脑假说（IBH）。虽然主流社会神经科学认为社会认知仅产生于大脑中的事件，但IBH认为社会认知还需要大脑和社会环境之间的因果关系。我们讨论，反过来，基本要求的IBH在其最强的形式;经典的认知观点，可以提出反对IBH;辩护的IBH在这些参数的光;和对此的回应。我们的目标是在认知神经科学和社会认知的生成观点之间展开对话。最后，我们提出了一些新的方向和重点，社会神经科学可能采取。
A recent framework inspired by phenomenological philosophy, dynamical systems theory, embodied cognition and robotics has proposed the interactive brain hypothesis (IBH). Whereas mainstream social neuroscience views social cognition as arising solely from events in the brain, the IBH argues that social cognition requires, in addition, causal relations between the brain and the social environment. We discuss, in turn, the foundational claims for the IBH in its strongest form; classical views of cognition that can be raised against the IBH; a defence of the IBH in the light of these arguments; and a response to this. Our goal is to initiate a dialogue between cognitive neuroscience and enactive views of social cognition. We conclude by suggesting some new directions and emphases that social neuroscience might take.