Bargaining in Stationary Networks
Bargaining in Stationary Networks
复制标题
固定网络中的讨价还价
DOI：
10.1257/aer.101.5.2042
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Mihai Manea
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Mihai Manea
我们研究了无限水平博弈，其中连接在网络中的两个玩家随机匹配讨价还价。达成协议的球员将被网络中相同位置的新球员取代。我们证明了所有均衡都是收益等价的。当玩家变得耐心时，回报和协议链接集就会收敛。几个新概念-相互疏远的集合、合作伙伴和缺陷率-提供了对网络中职位的相对优势的洞察。我们开发了一个程序来确定所有参与者的极限均衡收益。还得到了公平和非歧视性网络的特征。(JEL C78，D85)
We study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain. Players who reach agreement are replaced by new players at the same positions in the network. We show that all equilibria are payoff equivalent. The payoffs and the set of agreement links converge as players become patient. Several new concepts—mutually estranged sets, partners, and shortage ratios—provide insights into the relative strengths of the positions in the network. We develop a procedure to determine the limit equilibrium payoffs for all players. Characterizations of equitable and nondiscriminatory networks are also obtained. (JEL C78, D85)