Secure Middlebox Channel over TLS and its Resiliency against Middlebox Compromise
Secure Middlebox Channel over TLS and its Resiliency against Middlebox Compromise
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DOI：
10.1109/infocom53939.2023.10229081
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发表时间：
2023-05
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Kentaro Kita;Junji Takemasa;Y. Koizumi;T. Hasegawa
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文献类型：
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作者：
Kentaro Kita;Junji Takemasa;Y. Koizumi;T. Hasegawa
很大一部分互联网流量通过读取或修改消息的中间框。然而，随着越来越多的流量受到TLS的保护，中间盒正变得无法提供它们的功能。为了在保持通信安全性的同时利用中间盒功能，安全的中间盒通道协议被设计为TLS的扩展。一个关键思想是，端点显式地将中间层合并到TLS握手中，并授予每个中间层对其消息的读或写权限。由于每个中间盒具有最少的数据访问权限，因此这些协议具有抵御单个中间盒破坏的弹性。然而，现有的研究并没有全面分析多个中间盒被攻破情况下的通信安全问题。在本文中，我们提出了一种新的攻击方法，在这种情况下破坏现有协议的安全性，然后修改最先进的协议maTLS，以便以边际开销阻止所有攻击。
A large portion of Internet traffic passes through middleboxes that read or modify messages. However, as more traffic is protected with TLS, middleboxes are becoming unable to provide their functions. To leverage middlebox functionality while preserving communication security, secure middlebox channel protocols have been designed as extensions of TLS. A key idea is that the endpoints explicitly incorporate middleboxes into the TLS handshake and grant each middlebox either the read or the write permission for their messages. Because each middlebox has the least data access privilege, these protocols are resilient against the compromise of a single middlebox. However, the existing studies have not comprehensively analyzed the communication security under the scenarios where multiple middleboxes are compromised. In this paper, we present novel attacks that break the security of the existing protocols under such scenarios and then modify maTLS, the state-of-the-art protocol, so that all the attacks are prevented with marginal overhead.