Earnings management, horizon problem, and advisor posts for retiring CEOs
Earnings management, horizon problem, and advisor posts for retiring CEOs
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盈余管理、视野问题和退休首席执行官的顾问职位
DOI：
10.1016/j.pacfin.2023.101972
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发表时间：
2023
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
Suzuki Katsushi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ishida Souhei;Ogoe Satoshi;Suzuki Katsushi
顾问职位是首席执行官（CEO）退休后最重要的职业之一。我们使用日本上市公司顾问职位的独特手工收集数据，研究退休CEO是否夸大收益以获得顾问职位。与地平线问题相一致，我们发现，在CEO退休后的职业生涯被确定为顾问之前的一年，收益高估更大。这种关系对于内部监督较弱（较强）的公司也更明显（不太明显）。这些结果表明，退休的CEO选择增加收入的会计获得顾问的位置，这种机会主义的会计选择是更（少）明显的公司与较弱（强）的内部监控。
An advisor post is one of the most important post-retirement careers for a chief executive officer (CEO). Using unique hand-collected data on advisor posts in Japanese listed firms, we examine whether retiring CEOs overstate earnings to acquire an advisor post. Consistent with the horizon problem, we find that earnings overstatement is greater in the year immediately before the CEO's post-retirement career is determined to be an advisor. This relation is also more (less) pronounced for firms with weaker (stronger) internal monitoring. These results suggest that retiring CEOs choose income-increasing accounting to acquire an advisor position, and such opportunistic accounting choice is more (less) pronounced in firms with weaker (stronger) internal monitoring.