Social Welfare Maximization and Conformism via Information Design in Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian Games
Social Welfare Maximization and Conformism via Information Design in Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian Games
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线性二次高斯博弈中信息设计的社会福利最大化与从众
DOI：
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发表时间：
2021
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Ceyhun Eksin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Furkan Sezer;Hossein Khazaei;Ceyhun Eksin
我们考虑线性二次高斯（LQG）游戏中，玩家有二次收益，取决于玩家的行动和一个未知的收益相关的状态，和信号的状态，遵循高斯分布的状态实现的条件。信息设计者决定透露给参与者的信息的保真度，以最大化参与者的社会福利或减少参与者之间的行动分歧。利用信息设计问题的半确定性，我们得到了这些目标的解析解在特定的LQG游戏。我们表明，充分的信息披露最大化社会福利时，有一个共同的收益相关的状态，当有战略替代性的球员的行动，或当信号是公开的。数值结果表明，随着战略替代的增加，信息披露的价值增加。当目标是诱导局中人的行为一致时，隐藏信息是最优的。最后，我们考虑的信息设计目标，是一个加权组合的社会福利和凝聚力的球员的行动。我们得到了一个区间的权重，充分的信息披露是最佳的公共信号下的战略替代性的游戏。数值解表明，充分信息披露的最佳实际区间接近替代增加得到的分析区间。
We consider linear-quadratic Gaussian (LQG) games in which players have quadratic payoffs that depend on the players’ actions and an unknown payoff-relevant state, and signals on the state that follow a Gaussian distribution conditional on the state realization. An information designer decides the fidelity of information revealed to the players in order to maximize the social welfare of the players or reduce the disagreement among players’ actions. Leveraging the semi-definiteness of the information design problem, we derive analytical solutions for these objectives under specific LQG games. We show that full information disclosure maximizes social welfare when there is a common payoff-relevant state, when there is strategic substitutability in the actions of players, or when the signals are public. Numerical results show that as strategic substitution increases, the value of the information disclosure increases. When the objective is to induce conformity among players’ actions, hiding information is optimal. Lastly, we consider the information design objective that is a weighted combination of social welfare and cohesiveness of players’ actions. We obtain an interval for the weights where full information disclosure is optimal under public signals for games with strategic substitutability. Numerical solutions show that the actual interval where full information disclosure is optimal gets close to the analytical interval obtained as substitution increases.
反协调网络游戏中的学习控制
影响因子：
4.2
作者：
Eksin, Ceyhun;Paarporn, Keith
通讯作者：
Paarporn, Keith