Topping up or opting out? The optimal design of public provision schemes
Topping up or opting out? The optimal design of public provision schemes
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DOI：
10.2307/2527299
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发表时间：
1998-05-01
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
Christiansen, V
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Blomquist, S;Christiansen, V
在所有发达国家，公共部门都广泛提供私人物品。公共供应计划的设计往往使个人可以选择退出，但不能补足（补充）公共提供的数量/质量。使用最优所得税/公共供应模型，我们得出相应的条件下，公共供应计划应允许或禁止补充。如果不考虑管理成本，那么如果对公共产品的需求增加，那么个人不允许充值的制度是最优的，而如果对公共产品的需求减少，那么允许个人充值的制度是合理的。
There is extensive public provision of private goods in all developed countries. The public provision scheme is often designed so that individuals can opt out, but not top up (supplement) the publicly provided quantity/quality. Using an optimal income tax/public provision model we derive the respective conditions under which a public provision scheme should allow or forbid supplementing. Disregarding administrative costs, a system where individuals are not allowed to top up is optimal if the demand for the publicly provided good increases in the amount of leisure available, while a scheme allowing individuals to top up is warranted if the demand decreases with the amount of leisure.