INDUSTRIAL GROUPS AS SYSTEMS OF CONTRACTUAL GOVERNANCE
INDUSTRIAL GROUPS AS SYSTEMS OF CONTRACTUAL GOVERNANCE
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作为契约治理系统的产业集团
DOI：
10.1093/oxrep/8.3.24
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发表时间：
1992
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
W. Kester
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
W. Kester
1992年4月3日，美国司法部宣布，只要能够证明海外发生的限制美国出口的行为对美国出口造成不利影响，并且“涉及违反美国反托拉斯法的反竞争活动”，它将“对这种行为采取反托拉斯执法行动，不论是否对美国消费者造成直接损害”（汉普顿，1992年）。司法部官员明确表示，这一政策转变不针对任何特定国家，在适用时将受到严格限制。然而，美国司法部长早些时候的言论强烈暗示，该政策的主要目标将是日本的经连会（Baker和艾耶尔，1992年）。这些公司是围绕一家主要银行、贸易公司或一家主要工业公司结成联盟的公司集团，在密切、稳定、合作的商业关系中相互作用。推而广之，其他国家可能存在的类似工业集团最终也可能成为此类反垄断执法的目标。时间将证明，这一政策是得到大力推行，还是仅仅是选举年的武力炫耀。然而，无论是哪种情况，它的正式采用都突出了有关工业集团的问题，这些问题最近才成为国际辩论的前沿，即公司所有权、治理实践和全球竞争产品市场中的工业绩效之间的关系。工业集团化主要是为了限制贸易，从而损害全球经济福利，还是能够产生真正的效率，提高福利？一个国家应该如何努力达到亚当·斯密的理想，即在以自由进入和退出为特征的市场中进行原子式的、基于价格的竞争？在构建高度定制的，甚至是独家的协议时，公司应该有多大的自由度-
On 3 April 1992 the US Justice Department announced that it would take'antitrust enforcement action against conduct occurring overseas [emphasis added] that restrains US exports, whether or not there is direct harm to US consumers' whenever it can be shown that the conduct adversely affects US exports and'involves anti-competitive activities which violate the US antitrust laws'(Hampton, 1992). Justice Department officials made it plain that the policy shift was not aimed at any particular countries and would be narrowly restricted in its application. Nevertheless, earlier remarks by the US Attorney General suggested strongly that a major target of the policy would be Japan's keiretsu (Baker and Ayer, 1992). These are groups of companies confederated around a major bank, trading company, or a major industrial corporation and interacting within the context of close, stable, cooperative commercial relationships. By extension, similar industrial groups that might be found in other countries might also eventually become targets of such antitrust enforcement.Time will prove whether this policy is vigorously pursued or is merely election-year sabre rattling. In either event, however, its formal adoption spotlights questions about industrial groups that have only recently moved to the forefront of international debate about the relationships between corporate ownership, governance practices, and industrial performance in globally competitive product markets. Are industrial groupings chiefly exercises in restraint of trade, thereby harming global economic welfare, or are they capable of generating true efficiencies that enhance welfare? How assiduously should a nation strive to reach Adam Smith's ideal of atomistic, price-based competition in markets characterized by free entry and exit? How much latitude should companies be given in structuring highly customized, even exclusive agree-