The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks
The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1593383
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发表时间：
2009-12
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
M. Umezawa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Umezawa
本文考虑在树形网络上提供两种公共物品，其中每个代理都有单峰偏好。我们证明，如果至少有四个代理人，则不存在满足效率和替代统治的社会选择规则。事实上，即使代理人的偏好仅限于对称单峰偏好的较小范围，这些属性也是不相容的。然而，对于区间上的规则，我们证明宫川（Soc Choice Welf 18:527–541, 2001）的描述，即只有左峰规则和右峰规则满足这两个属性，也适用于对称单峰偏好的领域。此外，如果代理的峰值位置仅限于树的节点或端点，则规则存在于树的子类上。我们为该树子类提供了一系列此类规则的表征。
This article considers the provision of two public goods on tree networks where each agent has a single-peaked preference. We show that if there are at least four agents, then no social choice rule exists that satisfies efficiency and replacement-domination. In fact, these properties are incompatible, even if agents’ preferences are restricted to a smaller domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. However, for rules on an interval, we prove that Miyagawa’s (Soc Choice Welf 18:527–541, 2001) characterization that only the left-peaks rule and the right-peaks rule satisfy both of these properties also holds on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. Moreover, if agents’ peak locations are restricted to either the nodes or the endpoints of trees, rules exist on a subclass of trees. We provide a characterization of a family of such rules for this tree subclass.