Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate
Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate
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DOI：
10.1177/1745691612460685
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发表时间：
2013-05-01
影响因子：
12.6
通讯作者：
Stanovich, Keith E.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Evans, Jonathan St B. T.;Stanovich, Keith E.
认知心理学和社会心理学中的双过程和双系统理论最近受到了许多批评。然而，它们作为一个类别受到了攻击，错误地假设存在一个适用于所有人的通用版本。我们确定并回应了这些批评者提出的5条主要论点。我们同意，这些论点中的一些对文献中的一些理论有说服力，但认为它们被夸大了。我们认为，认知科学的最新证据支持双重加工的区别。我们偏爱的理论方法是，假设快速自主过程(类型1)产生默认反应，除非被独特的更高阶推理过程(类型2)干预。定义不同之处的是，类型2加工支持假设性思维，并对工作记忆造成很大负担。
Dual-process and dual-system theories in both cognitive and social psychology have been subjected to a number of recently published criticisms. However, they have been attacked as a category, incorrectly assuming there is a generic version that applies to all. We identify and respond to 5 main lines of argument made by such critics. We agree that some of these arguments have force against some of the theories in the literature but believe them to be overstated. We argue that the dual-processing distinction is supported by much recent evidence in cognitive science. Our preferred theoretical approach is one in which rapid autonomous processes (Type 1) are assumed to yield default responses unless intervened on by distinctive higher order reasoning processes (Type 2). What defines the difference is that Type 2 processing supports hypothetical thinking and load heavily on working memory.