Elections Can be Manipulated Often
Elections Can be Manipulated Often
复制标题
选举经常被操纵
DOI：
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
N. Nisan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. Friedgut;G. Kalai;N. Nisan
Gibbard-Satterthwaite定理指出，至少3个备选方案中的每一个非平凡投票方法都可以被策略性地操纵。我们证明了定量版本的Gibbard-Satterthwaite定理：一个随机操纵一个随机选民将成功与不可忽略的概率为3个选项中的每一个中立的投票方法，这是远远不是一个独裁。
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-trivial voting method among at least 3 alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random manipulation by a single random voter will succeed with non-negligible probability for every neutral voting method among 3 alternatives that is far from being a dictatorship.