International Security, Multiple Public Good Provisions, and the Exploitation Hypothesis
International Security, Multiple Public Good Provisions, and the Exploitation Hypothesis
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国际安全、多种公共物品规定和剥削假说
DOI：
10.1080/10242694.2012.752229
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
and Shintaro Nakagawa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ihori;Toshihiro;Martin McGuire;and Shintaro Nakagawa
自20世纪60年代Olson-Zeckhauser（1966）的分析以来，它的“以小取大”为经济学家提供了联盟提供安全/防御的核心模型。但随着冷战的结束，各国的分配行为已经明显偏离了奥兹的预测，即国防是一种自愿提供的同质纯公共产品。本文提出了一个替代OZ，与“国防”，而不是被汇总到他们的单一公共产品的本质区别是分解成更现实的自我保险和自我保护的类别。由于公共物品群体的分配行为本质上是由收入效应驱动的，我们将重点放在这些变得复杂和冲突的因素上，从而为物品劣势提供了更大的空间。分析之后的数值模拟，符合实际经验的分配在北约比传统的“剥削”模型。
Since the 1960s Olson-Zeckhauser’s (1966) analysis, its ‘exploitation of the great by the small’ has provided economists’ core model of alliance’s provision of security/defense. But with the end of the Cold War, countries’ allocative behavior has diverged markedly from OZ’s predictions for defense as a homogeneous pure public good voluntarily provided. This paper suggests a replacement for OZ, with the essential difference that ‘defense’ rather than being aggregated into their single public good is disaggregated into more realistic categories of self-insurance and self-protection. Because allocative behavior in public good groups is essentially driven by income effects, we concentrate on these, which become complex and conflicted, giving much greater scope for goods-inferiority. The analysis is followed by numerical simulations, which conform to actual experienced allocations in NATO much better than the conventional ‘exploitation’ model.