LIES IN DISGUISEAN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON CHEATING

LIES IN DISGUISEAN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON CHEATING
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DOI:
10.1111/jeea.12014
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发表时间:
2013-06-01
影响因子:
3.6
通讯作者:
Foellmi-Heusi, Franziska
Foellmi-Heusi, Franziska
中科院分区:
经济学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Fischbacher, Urs;Foellmi-Heusi, Franziska

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我们提出了一种新颖的实验设计来衡量诚实和谎言。参与者会收到一个他们私下掷的骰子。由于他们的回报取决于所报告的骰子掷数,因此受试者有动机不诚实并报告更高的数字以获得更高的回报。这种设计具有三个优点。首先,作弊行为无法在个人层面上被发现,这减少了潜在的需求影响。其次,该方法非常容易实现。第三,在完全诚实的情况下,结果的潜在真实分布是已知的,因此可以测试不同的理论预测。我们发现,大约 20% 的缺乏经验的受试者会尽可能地撒谎,而 39% 的受试者则完全诚实。此外,很大一部分受试者是部分撒谎者;这些受试者撒谎,但不报告收益最大化抽签。我们讨论解释观察到的行为模式的不同动机。
We present a novel experimental design to measure honesty and lying. Participants receive a die which they roll privately. Since their payoff depends on the reported roll of the die, the subjects have an incentive to be dishonest and report higher numbers to get a higher payoff. This design has three advantages. First, cheating cannot be detected on the individual level, which reduces potential demand effects. Second, the method is very easy to implement. Third, the underlying true distribution of the outcome under full honesty is known, and hence it is possible to test different theoretical predictions. We find that about 20% of inexperienced subjects lie to the fullest extent possible while 39% of subjects are fully honest. In addition, a high share of subjects consists of partial liars; these subjects lie, but do not report the payoff-maximizing draw. We discuss different motives that explain the observed behavioral pattern.