Cui Bono? The Selective Revealing of Knowledge and Its Implications for Innovative Activity
Cui Bono? The Selective Revealing of Knowledge and Its Implications for Innovative Activity
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1639325
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发表时间：
2012-07
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
O. Alexy;G. George;A. Salter
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
O. Alexy;G. George;A. Salter
当前关于组织如何利用知识进行创新活动的理论不能令人信服地解释企业选择性地向其优势展示知识的紧急实践。我们认为，选择性揭示作为一种战略机制，以重塑企业的创新生态系统中的其他参与者的合作行为。我们建议，选择性揭示可能提供一个有效的替代已知的合作机制，特别是在合作伙伴的不确定性高，协调成本高，不愿意的潜在合作者的条件下。我们指定的条件下，企业更有可能揭示知识，并强调竞争对手互惠的一些边界条件。我们详细阐述了战略，让企业展示管理机构在选择性揭示和讨论选择性揭示的组织和开放式创新的理论和管理实践的影响。
Current theories of how organizations harness knowledge for innovative activity cannot convincingly explain emergent practices whereby firms selectively reveal knowledge to their advantage. We conceive of selective revealing as a strategic mechanism to reshape the collaborative behavior of other actors in a firm's innovation ecosystem. We propose that selective revealing may provide an effective alternative to known collaboration mechanisms, particularly under conditions of high partner uncertainty, high coordination costs, and unwilling potential collaborators. We specify conditions when firms are more likely to reveal knowledge and highlight some boundary conditions for competitor reciprocity. We elaborate on strategies that allow firms to exhibit managerial agency in selective revealing and discuss selective revealing's implications for theories of organization and open innovation and for management practice.