The No Alternatives Argument
The No Alternatives Argument
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没有其他选择的论点
DOI:
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发表时间:
2015
影响因子:
3.4
通讯作者:
J. Sprenger
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
R. Dawid;S. Hartmann;J. Sprenger
Scientific theories are hard to find, and once scientists have found a theory, H, they often believe that there are not many distinct alternatives to H. But is this belief justified? What should scientists believe about the number of alternatives to H, and how should they change these beliefs in the light of new evidence? These are some of the questions that we will address in this article. We also ask under which conditions failure to find an alternative to H confirms the theory in question. This kind of reasoning (which we call the ‘no alternatives argument’) is frequently used in science and therefore deserves a careful philosophical analysis. 1 Introduction 2 The Conceptual Framework 3 The No Alternatives Argument 4 Discussion I: A Quantitative Analysis of the No Alternatives Argument 5 Discussion II: The Number of Alternatives and the Problem of Underdetermination 6 Conclusions Appendix A Appendix B 1 Introduction 2 The Conceptual Framework 3 The No Alternatives Argument 4 Discussion I: A Quantitative Analysis of the No Alternatives Argument 5 Discussion II: The Number of Alternatives and the Problem of Underdetermination 6 Conclusions Appendix A Appendix B Appendix A Appendix B