‘Recover it From the Facts as We Know Them’: Practice-dependence’s Predecessors

‘Recover it From the Facts as We Know Them’: Practice-dependence’s Predecessors
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“从我们所知道的事实中恢复它”:实践依赖的前身

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发表时间:
2016
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通讯作者:
R. Jubb
R. Jubb
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作者:
R. Jubb

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用Andrea Sangiovanni的话来说,实践依赖理论家认为“(给定价值)概念的内容、范围和正当性取决于该概念意欲支配的实践的结构和形式”。他们倾向于将其呈现为方法论上的创新,但在这里,我指出当代实践依赖理论家和其他人的方法论承诺之间的相似之处,特别是p·f·斯特劳森在他的《自由与怨恨》和伯纳德·威廉姆斯。我认为,通过观察斯特劳森和威廉姆斯的做法,我们可以为采取一种或另一种形式的实践依赖增加理由。我们希望我们的原则将管理的实践的内部复杂性可能需要它。然而,这种对实践依赖的辩护也给自我认同的实践依赖理论家带来了压力,这表明他们需要做更多的工作来证明他们的理论所依赖的实践的解释是正确的。
In Andrea Sangiovanni’s words, practice-dependent theorists hold that “[t]he content, scope, and justification of a conception of [a given value] depends on the structure and form of the practices that the conception is intended to govern”. They have tended to present this as methodologically innovative, but here I point to the similarities between the methodological commitments of contemporary practice-dependent theorists and others, particularly P. F. Strawson in his Freedom and Resentment and Bernard Williams in general. I suggest that by looking at what Strawson and Williams did, we can add to the reasons for adopting one form or another of practice-dependence. The internal complexity of the practices we hope our principles will govern may require it. However, this defence of practice-dependence also puts pressure on self-identified practice-dependence theorists, suggesting that they need to do more work to justify the interpretations of the practices their theories rely on.