Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility
Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility
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责任、性格和情感：理智和责任的形而上学
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发表时间：
1988
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通讯作者：
S. Wolf
中科院分区：
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作者：
S. Wolf
研究自由意志和责任问题的哲学家比大多数人更容易应对他们的工作与普通的相关性的挑战，实际关注。事实上，研究这些问题的哲学家很少面临这样的挑战，因为有关责任条件的问题在日常生活中出现得如此明显和频繁。然而，在仔细研究之下，人们可能会质疑这一领域中哲学和非哲学关注点之间的联系是否是真实的。在日常生活中，当律师、法官、父母和其他人关心责任问题时，他们知道，或者认为他们知道，一般来说，责任的条件是什么。他们的问题是应用问题：这个或那个特定的人是否符合这个或那个特定的条件？这个人是否足够成熟，或者足够了解，或者足够理智，能够承担责任？他或她是在催眠后的暗示下还是在精神损害药物的影响下行动的？在这些背景下，人们假定正常的、充分发展的成年人是负责任的人。这些问题与特定个体福尔斯是否属于正常范围有关。相比之下，哲学家们往往不确定责任的一般条件，他们关心的不是区分负责任的人和不负责任的人，而是确定我们中的任何人是否对任何事情负责，如果是的话，为什么。在课堂上，我们可能会争辩说，哲学问题是从非哲学问题中产生的，它们从非哲学问题停止的地方开始。
Philosophers who study the problems of free will and responsibility have an easier time than most in meeting challenges about the relevance of their work to ordinary, practical concerns. Indeed, philosophers who study these problems are rarely faced with such challenges at all, since questions concerning the conditions of responsibility come up so obviously and so frequently in everyday life. Under scrutiny, however, one might question whether the connections between philosophical and nonphilosophical concerns in this area are real. In everyday contexts, when lawyers, judges, parents, and others are concerned with issues of responsibility, they know, or think they know, what in general the conditions of responsibility are. Their questions are questions of application: Does this or that particular person meet this or that particular condition? Is this person mature enough, or informed enough, or sane enough to be responsible? Was he or she acting under posthypnotic suggestion or under the influence of a mind-impairing drug? It is assumed, in these contexts, that normal, fully developed adult human beings are responsible beings. The questions have to do with whether a given individual falls within the normal range. By contrast, philosophers tend to be uncertain about the general conditions of responsibility, and they care less about dividing the responsible from the nonresponsible agents than about determining whether, and if so why, any of us are ever responsible for anything at all. In the classroom, we might argue that the philosophical concerns grow out of the nonphilosophical ones, that they take off where the nonphilosophical questions stop.