Science Fictions: How Fraud, Bias, Negligence, and Hype Undermine the Search for Truth by Stuart Ritchie
Science Fictions: How Fraud, Bias, Negligence, and Hype Undermine the Search for Truth by Stuart Ritchie
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科幻小说：欺诈、偏见、疏忽和炒作如何破坏对真理的探索作者：斯图尔特·里奇
DOI：
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发表时间：
2021
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通讯作者：
Henry H. Bauer
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作者：
Henry H. Bauer
这本书做了出色的工作，描述和记录当代科学的功能失调的特点，在书的副标题中提到。如果我还在教书，我会让我的学生读这本书，作为许多富有成效的课堂讨论的基础。我的复印件的空白处满是笔记、评论和进一步阅读的线索。80页的尾注，大约260页的文本，是最好的和最有趣的文件，我能回忆起曾经发现在这样一本书。无论如何，我全心全意地推荐这本书;我怀疑任何对当代科学的本质感兴趣的人都不会被告知并找到进一步思考和阅读的刺激。
序言已经承诺，这将是一个翻页。许多人会感到惊讶和沮丧的充分记录的情况下，表面上杰出的学者，其工作主要或完全是欺诈性的，如与迪德里克斯塔佩尔（第100页）。4-5后来）。
里奇非常恰当地将复制视为科学的本质（第5页）：“如果它不会复制，那么很难将你所做的描述为科学。”请注意，这是一个经验性的陈述，而不是波普尔的标准，即理论如果要被认为是科学的，原则上必须是可证伪的。如果一个声称的可观察现象不能被重复，那么我们就不能知道它是真实的，甚至不能知道它在第一次被声称时发生过一次。这就是超心理学、神秘动物学以及一般的神秘学的持续困境。里奇指出，科学界未能妥善处理斯塔佩尔案件中的复制问题，以及达里尔·贝姆声称的预知证据。总的来说，同行评议和期刊出版实践并没有将科学从“一系列令人眼花缭乱的无能、妄想、谎言和自欺”中拯救出来。
This book does a splendid job of describing and documenting the dysfunctional features of contemporary science mentioned in the book’s subtitle. Were I still teaching, I would have my students read this book as the basis for many productive class discussions. The margins of my copy overflow with notes, comments, and cues for further reading. The 80 pages of endnotes, for some 260 pages of text, are the best and most interesting documentation that I can recall ever finding in such a book. At any rate, I recommend this book wholeheartedly; I doubt that anyone interested in the nature of contemporary science will fail to be informed and to find stimulation for further thought and reading.
The Preface already promises that this will be a page-turner. Many will be astonished and disheartened by the fully documented cases of outwardly distinguished academics whose work was largely or completely fraudulent, as with Diederik Stapel (pp. 4–5 and later).
Ritchie quite appropriately sees replication as the essence of science (p. 5): “If it won’t replicate, then it’s hard to describe what you’ve done as scientific at all.” Note that this is an empirical statement, not the Popperian criterion that theories must be falsifiable in principle if they are to be regarded as scientific. If a claimed observable phenomenon cannot be repeated, then we cannot know that it was real, that it happened even once, when first claimed. That’s the continuing dilemma for parapsychology, cryptozoology, for anomalistics in general. Ritchie points out that the scientific community failed to handle appropriately the issue of replication in the case of Stapel, and also with Daryl Bem’s claimed evidence of precognition. Overall, peer review and journal publication practices have not saved science from “a dizzying array of incompetence, delusion, lies, and self-deception” (p. 7).