Risk Sharing and Information in Village Economies
Risk Sharing and Information in Village Economies
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乡村经济的风险分担和信息
DOI：
10.1111/1467-937x.00071
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发表时间：
1998
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Ethan Ligon
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ethan Ligon
实现有效分担风险的安排因经济体中各行为体可获得的信息而异。通常的欧拉方程在一个服从永久收入假设的经济体中限制了有效配置，而在一个具有私人信息和长期合同的经济体中，有效配置满足对称限制，但不满足欧拉方程。全额保险安排的独特之处在于它们满足这两种限制。我们看看一个环境中，似乎长期合同发挥作用，在减轻私人信息的影响：在印度南部的三个村庄经济。对于三个村庄中的两个村庄的家庭来说，消费分配满足私人信息限制的证据相当强;第三个村庄的证据表明，虽然一些家庭的消费满足私人信息限制，但其他家庭的消费服从永久收入假设。
Arrangements for achieving efficient risk-sharing vary depending on the information available to agents in the economy. The usual Euler equation restricts efficient allocations in an economy which obeys the permanent income hypothesis, while efficient allocations in an economy with private information and long-term contracts satisfy a symmetric restriction, but not the Euler equation. Full insurance arrangements are unique in that they satisfy both restrictions. We look at an environment in which it seems likely that long-term contracts play a role in mitigating the effects of private information: three village economies in South India. The evidence that consumption allocations satisfy the private information restriction is quite strong for households in two of the three villages; the evidence for the third village suggests that while consumption for some households satisfies the private information restrictions, other households' consumption obey the permanent income hypothesis.