Kant’s Original Space and Time as Mere Grounds for Possibilities
Kant’s Original Space and Time as Mere Grounds for Possibilities
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康德最初的空间和时间只是可能性的基础
DOI：
10.1017/s1369415421000182
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发表时间：
2021
期刊：
影响因子：
0.5
通讯作者：
Thomas Raysmith
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Thomas Raysmith
在《纯粹理性批判》中，康德似乎对他所认为的我们对空间和时间的先验表征的统一性提出了不相容的主张。我认为，这些表征是独立于所有综合的单一的，并解释了这是如何避免其他立场遇到的问题，关于先验演绎及其与先验美学的关系，在该工作。核心是主张这些表示（1）当被表征为直觉并被认为先于任何感性情感时，只包含无限的仅仅可能的有限空间和时间表示，（2）是表示，这些表示仅仅是接受或产生感性中的有限表示的可能性的先验基础，这些可能性是确定的。（在接收的情况下，立即）通过雅阁类别的合成。
Abstract In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant appears to make incompatible claims regarding the unitary natures of what he takes to be our a priori representations of space and time. I argue that these representations are unitary independently of all synthesis and explain how this avoids problems encountered by other positions regarding the Transcendental Deduction and its relation to the Transcendental Aesthetic in that work. Central is the claim that these representations (1) contain, when characterized as intuitions and considered as prior to any affections of sensibility, only an infinitude of merely possible finite spatial and temporal representations, and (2) are representations that are merely transcendental grounds for the possibilities for receiving or generating finite representations in sensibility that are determined (immediately, in the case of reception) by means of syntheses that accord with the categories.