Template Attacks
Template Attacks
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DOI：
10.1007/3-540-36400-5_3
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发表时间：
2002-08
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Suresh Chari;J. Rao;P. Rohatgi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Suresh Chari;J. Rao;P. Rohatgi
我们提出了模板攻击，这是信息论意义上可能的最强形式的侧通道攻击。这些攻击可以破坏实现和对策，这些实现和对策的安全性依赖于这样的假设：对手不能获得多于一个或有限数量的侧信道样本。他们要求对手能够访问一个相同的实验设备，他可以根据自己的选择进行编程。在这种受约束的情况下，这些攻击的成功取决于每个样本中的噪声的处理方式。与以前的方法将噪声视为必须减少或消除的障碍不同，我们的方法专注于精确建模噪声，并利用这一点来完全提取单个样本中存在的信息。我们详细描述了不受SPA和DPA等技术约束的RC4实现如何通过使用单个样本的模板攻击轻松破解。其他应用包括攻击使用抗DPA硬件的某些DES实现和某些SSL加速器，这些加速器可以通过监视RSA操作的电磁辐射来攻击，即使距离为15英尺。
We presenttemplate attacks, the strongest form of side channel attack possible in an information theoretic sense. These attacks can break implementations and countermeasures whose security is dependent on the assumption that an adversary cannot obtain more than one or a limited number of side channel samples. They require that an adversary has access to an identical experimental device that he can program to his choosing. The success of these attacks in such constraining situations is due manner in which noise within each sample is handled. In contrast to previous approaches which viewed noise as a hindrance that had to be reduced or eliminated, our approach focuses on precisely modeling noise, and using this to fully extract information present in a single sample. We describe in detail how an implementation of RC4, not amenable to techniques such as SPA and DPA, can easily be broken using template attacks with a single sample. Other applications include attacks on certain DES implementations which use DPA-resistant hardware and certain SSL accelerators which can be attacked by monitoring electromagnetic emanations from an RSA operation even from distances of fifteen feet.