Bio-chemical Assay Locking to Thwart Bio-IP Theft
Bio-chemical Assay Locking to Thwart Bio-IP Theft
复制标题
DOI：
10.1145/3365579
复制
发表时间：
2019-11
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Sukanta Bhattacharjee;Jack Tang;Sudip Poddar;Mohamed Ibrahim;R. Karri;K. Chakrabarty
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Sukanta Bhattacharjee;Jack Tang;Sudip Poddar;Mohamed Ibrahim;R. Karri;K. Chakrabarty
预计随着数字微流控生物芯片（dmfb）的成熟，硬件设计流程将开始类似于半导体行业目前的做法：设计团队将芯片布局发送给第三方代工厂进行制造。这些代工厂不受信任，并威胁要窃取宝贵的知识产权（IP）。在DMFB中，IP不仅包括硬件布局，还包括旨在在芯片上执行的生化分析（生物分析）。因此，DMFB设计者必须保护这些协议不被窃取。我们建议通过插入假混合分裂操作来“锁定”生化分析。我们通过实验评估了提出的锁定机制，并展示了如何在低复杂性的生物测定中实现高水平的保护。我们还展示了一类新的攻击，利用侧信道信息对锁定的生物测定进行复杂的攻击。
It is expected that as digital microfluidic biochips (DMFBs) mature, the hardware design flow will begin to resemble the current practice in the semiconductor industry: design teams send chip layouts to third-party foundries for fabrication. These foundries are untrusted and threaten to steal valuable intellectual property (IP). In a DMFB, the IP consists of not only hardware layouts but also of the biochemical assays (bioassays) that are intended to be executed on-chip. DMFB designers therefore must defend these protocols against theft. We propose to “lock” biochemical assays by inserting dummy mix-split operations. We experimentally evaluate the proposed locking mechanism, and show how a high level of protection can be achieved even on bioassays with low complexity. We also demonstrate a new class of attacks that exploit the side-channel information to launch sophisticated attacks on the locked bioassay.