Alternative auction objectives and pricing schemes in short-term electricity markets
Alternative auction objectives and pricing schemes in short-term electricity markets
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短期电力市场的替代拍卖目标和定价方案
DOI：
10.1109/pes.2009.5275933
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
T. Zheng
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
E. Litvinov;F. Zhao;T. Zheng
拍卖目标和定价方案对于电力市场设计的成功至关重要。美国电力市场目前采用的投标成本最小化拍卖目标和经济调度定价方案引发了学术界和工业界的许多质疑。本文总结了最近研究中提出的几种替代拍卖目标和定价方案。然后通过说明性示例讨论结合拍卖目标和定价方案的不同市场设计。我们的结论是，当前的设计绝不是完美的，在许多方面都需要重大改进，但可能仍然是当今最可行的解决方案。此外，人们认为非常需要通过经济学家和工程师的联合力量进一步研究电力市场设计，并确定了几个潜在的重要研究主题。
Auction objective and pricing scheme are of great importance to a successful electricity market design. The bid-cost minimization auction objective and the economic-dispatch pricing scheme currently used in U.S. electricity markets have stimulated many questions from both academia and industry. This paper summarizes several alternative auction objectives and pricing schemes proposed in recent research. Different market designs by combining an auction objective and a pricing scheme are then discussed with illustrative examples. Our conclusion is that the current design is by no means perfect and needs significant improvement in many aspects, but probably is still the most viable solution to this day. Also, further study of electricity market design through a combined force of economists and engineers is believed to be much needed, and several potentially important research topics are identified.