CONFIRMATION, DISCONFIRMATION, AND INFORMATION IN HYPOTHESIS-TESTING
CONFIRMATION, DISCONFIRMATION, AND INFORMATION IN HYPOTHESIS-TESTING
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DOI：
10.1037/0033-295x.94.2.211
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发表时间：
1987-04-01
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
HA, YW
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
KLAYMAN, J;HA, YW
科学研究和日常推理中的假设检验策略引起了心理学家和哲学家的兴趣。这些学者中的一些人强调了不证实在推理中的重要性，并认为人们反而倾向于普遍有害的“证实偏见”。特别是，它表明人们倾向于测试那些最有可能验证当前信念的案例，而不是那些最有可能伪造它们的案例。然而，我们发现，许多现象标记为“确认偏差”更好地理解在一般的积极测试策略。使用这种策略，有一种趋势是测试那些预期（或已知）具有感兴趣的属性的用例，而不是那些预期（或已知）缺乏该属性的用例。这种策略是不等同于确认偏见在第一个意义上，我们表明，积极的测试策略可以是一个很好的启发式的真实或虚假的假设在现实条件下确定。然而，它可能导致系统错误或效率低下。人类假设检验策略和最佳策略处方的适当性必须从策略和手头任务之间的相互作用来理解。
Strategies for hypothesis testing in scientific investigation and everyday reasoning have interested both psychologists and philosophers. A number of these scholars stress the importance of disconfirmation in reasoning and suggest that people are instead prone to a general deleterious “confirmation bias.” In particular, it is suggested that people tend to test those cases that have the best chance of verifying current beliefs rather than those that have the best chance of falsifying them. We show, however, that many phenomena labeled “confirmation bias” are better understood in terms of a general positive test strategy. With this strategy, there is a tendency to test cases that are expected (or known) to have the property of interest rather than those expected (or known) to lack that property. This strategy is not equivalent to confirmation bias in the first sense; we show that the positive test strategy can be a very good heuristic for determining the truth or falsity of a hypothesis under realistic conditions. It can, however, lead to systematic errors or inefficiencies. The appropriateness of human hypothesis-testing strategies and prescriptions about optimal strategies must be understood in terms of the interaction between the strategy and the task at hand.