Richard Rorty's Pragmatic Turn
Richard Rorty's Pragmatic Turn
复制标题
理查德·罗蒂的务实转向
DOI：
10.1002/9780470776407.ch8
复制
发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Habermas
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Habermas
从语言学转向的语用激进化中，罗蒂获得了对知识的非实在主义理解。为了检验他是否以正确的方式激进了语言学转向，我将把语境主义的方法与现代怀疑论者的认识论怀疑进行比较。在此过程中，我将回顾一个始终与真理的连贯概念有关的问题：如何将真理与理性的可接受性区分开来的问题。在回答这个问题时，有不同的哲学方式。罗蒂以牺牲日常的现实主义直觉为代价，将真理同化为证明，而其他人则试图在语言范式中考虑直觉，无论是借助于关于真理问题的紧缩策略，还是通过证明过程本身的理想化。一方面，我将对依赖于真理的语义概念的通缩策略提出质疑，而不是强调实用主义观点的优势。另一方面，还是从实用主义的角度，我将批评我自己曾经提出的一种对真理概念的认识化。在这样做的过程中，我将提出一种替代方案，以消除对真理的无条件主张。正是这种清算最终迫使罗蒂对语言化的理性进行了有问题的归化——或者，至少，导致了进一步的问题。
From the pragmatic radicalization of the linguistic turn Rorty obtains a nonrealist understanding of knowledge. In order to test whether he radicalizes the linguistic turn in the right way, I will then compare the contextualist approach with the epistemological doubt of the modern skeptic. In doing so I will recall a problem that was always connected with coherence conceptions of truth: the problem of how truth is to be distinguished from rational acceptability. In responding to this question, there is a parting of philosophical ways. Whereas Rorty assimilates truth to justification at the expense of everyday realist intuitions, others attempt to take account of intuitions even within the linguistic paradigm, whether with the help of a deflationary strategy as regards the problem of truth or through an idealization of the process of justification itself. On the one hand, I will take issue with the deflationary strategy that relies on a semantic conception of truth, emphasizing instead the advantages of a pragmatic viewpoint. On the other hand, again from a pragmatic perspective, I will criticize a kind of epistemization of the idea of truth that I myself once proposed. In doing so I will develop an alternative to the liquidation of unconditional claims to truth. It is this liquidation that has ultimately compelled Rorty to effect a problematic naturalization of linguistified reason–or, at any rate, one that leads to further problems.