On the Sources and Value of Information: Public Announcements and Macroeconomic Performance
On the Sources and Value of Information: Public Announcements and Macroeconomic Performance
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论信息的来源和价值：公告和宏观经济表现
DOI：
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
C. Wallace
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
David P. Myatt;C. Wallace
在宏观经济协调方面，对信息社会价值的研究对私人信息和公共信息作了明确区分。然而，没有任何信息是真正的公共（即公知）或私人在既定的意义上。本文开发了一个通用的方法，允许许多信息的信号，其中每一个都包含公共和私人信息的元素。相对公开性的度量决定了信号的均衡使用及其社会价值。当信号的公开性不同时，就会出现产出缺口（从而造成社会损失）：这种差异会在价格形成过程和预期形成过程之间造成隔阂。关于公开声明的效果，与以前的结果相反，完全隐瞒信息从来都不是社会最优的，完全公开（或者说完全私密）的信息也不是最优的。相反，当完美的沟通是可行的，有限的清晰度提高宏观经济表现。
In the context of macroeconomic coordination, studies of the social value of information distinguish sharply between private and public information. However, no information is truly public (that is, common knowledge) or private in the established sense. This paper develops a general approach by allowing for many informative signals each of which incorporates elements of both public and private information. A measure of relative publicity determines a signal's equilibrium use and its social value. Output gaps (and hence social losses) arise when signals differ in their publicity: such differences drive a wedge between price-formation and expectations-formation processes. Turning to the effect of public announcements, and contrary to previous results, it is never socially optimal to withhold information completely, nor is it optimal to release perfectly public (or, indeed, perfectly private) information. Instead, when perfect communication is feasible, limited clarity enhances macroeconomic performance.
DOI：
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发表时间：
1987
期刊：
The American Economic Review
影响因子：
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作者：
O. Blanchard;N. Kiyotaki
通讯作者：
O. Blanchard;N. Kiyotaki