Incentive compatible regulation of a foreign-owned subsidiary
Incentive compatible regulation of a foreign-owned subsidiary
复制标题
外资子公司的激励兼容监管
DOI：
10.1016/0022-1996(94)90006-x
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发表时间：
1994
影响因子：
3.3
通讯作者：
D. Nelson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Thomas A. Gresik;D. Nelson
转移价格是企业内部生产要素转移的管理费用。对于跨国公司来说，国际转移的转移价格提供了重新分配成本和增加全球利润的手段，因为各国的税收和利润汇回政策各不相同。因此，有必要对子公司进行地方监管，以限制战略性转移定价的福利成本。Prusa （Journal of International Economics, 1990,28, 155-172）描述了促使垄断子公司如实报告转让价格的福利最大化监管。然而，我们表明，实施鼓励企业歪曲其真实转移成本的法规可能更有效。
Transfer prices are administered charges for intra-firm transfers of factors of production. For a multinational firm, transfer prices for international transfers provide the means to redistribute costs and increase global profits given variations in national tax and profit repatriation policies. Local regulation of a subsidiary may thus be necessary to limit the welfare costs of strategic transfer pricing. Prusa (Journal of International Economics, 1990, 28, 155–172) characterizes the welfare-maximizing regulations for a monopoly subsidiary that induce the firm to report transfer prices truthfully. We show, however, that it can be more efficient to implement regulations that encourage the firm to misrepresent its true transfer costs.