Stealth Attacks on the Smart Grid
Stealth Attacks on the Smart Grid
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DOI：
10.1109/tsg.2019.2935353
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发表时间：
2018-08
影响因子：
9.6
通讯作者：
Ke Sun;I. Esnaola;S. Perlaza;H. V. Poor
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ke Sun;I. Esnaola;S. Perlaza;H. V. Poor
随机攻击，共同最大限度地减少由运营商获得的信息量有关的状态的网格和攻击检测的概率。该攻击通过最小化观测值和描述网格的状态变量之间的互信息来最小化操作者获得的信息。同时，攻击者的目标是通过最小化攻击存在时的分布与正常操作下的分布之间的Kullback-Leibler（KL）分歧来最小化攻击检测的概率。所得的成本函数是上述互信息和KL散度的加权和。攻击检测概率和互信息减少之间的权衡由代价函数中KL发散项的加权参数决定。攻击检测的概率被评估为加权参数的函数。给出了一个关于加权参数的充分条件，以实现任意小的攻击检测概率。在IEEE 14-Bus、30-Bus和118-Bus测试系统上对攻击性能进行了数值评估。
Random attacks that jointly minimize the amount of information acquired by the operator about the state of the grid and the probability of attack detection are presented. The attacks minimize the information acquired by the operator by minimizing the mutual information between the observations and the state variables describing the grid. Simultaneously, the attacker aims to minimize the probability of attack detection by minimizing the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between the distribution when the attack is present and the distribution under normal operation. The resulting cost function is the weighted sum of the mutual information and the KL divergence mentioned above. The trade-off between the probability of attack detection and the reduction of mutual information is governed by the weighting parameter on the KL divergence term in the cost function. The probability of attack detection is evaluated as a function of the weighting parameter. A sufficient condition on the weighting parameter is given for achieving an arbitrarily small probability of attack detection. The attack performance is numerically assessed on the IEEE 14-Bus, 30-Bus, and 118-Bus test systems.