The demand for contrastive explanations
The demand for contrastive explanations
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对对比解释的需求
DOI：
10.1007/s11098-018-1065-z
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
N. Elzein
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
N. Elzein
“对比解释”不仅解释了为什么某个事件A发生，而且解释了为什么A发生而不是另一个事件B。一些哲学家认为，只有当这些选择有对比解释时，代理人才能对他们的选择承担道德责任，因为否则他们就会“运气泛滥”。假设不能为因果关系未定的事件提供对比解释，这一要求意味着没有人可以对因果关系未定的选择负责。这些论点挑战不相容论，因为它们意味着因果决定论是道德责任的先决条件。然而，我认为，对于一类重要的选择，即使我们规定它们是确定的，我们也无法提供相关的对比解释。因此，因果决定论并不能解决运气泛滥的问题，在这种要求面前，相容主义者并不比不相容主义者好多少。这应该会削弱它的哲学吸引力。
A “contrastive explanation” explains not only why some event A occurred, but why A occurred as opposed to some alternative event B. Some philosophers argue that agents could only be morally responsible for their choices if those choices have contrastive explanations, since they would otherwise be “luck infested”. Assuming that contrastive explanations cannot be offered for causally undetermined events, this requirement entails that no one could be held responsible for a causally undetermined choice. Such arguments challenge incompatibilism, since they entail that causal determinism is a prerequisite for moral responsibility. However, I argue that for a significant class of choices, even if we stipulate that they are determined, we will be unable to provide a relevant contrastive explanation. Hence causal determinism is no remedy for luck infestation, and compatibilists do not fare much better than incompatibilists in the face of this requirement. This should serve to weaken its philosophical appeal.