Tariff elimination versus tax avoidance: free trade agreements and transfer pricing
Tariff elimination versus tax avoidance: free trade agreements and transfer pricing
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DOI：
10.1007/s10797-021-09689-8
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发表时间：
2021-09-04
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
Okoshi, Hirofumi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Mukunoki, Hiroshi;Okoshi, Hirofumi
本文探讨了原产地规则在跨国公司操纵转移价格以规避高额企业税时的新作用。自由贸易协定下的原产地规则要求出口商确定出口产品的原产地，以便有资格享受优惠税率。我们发现，ROO的增值标准限制了跨国公司滥用转让定价。有趣的是，带有原产地规则的自由贸易协定可以促使跨国公司将利润从低税收国家转移到高税收国家。由于原产地规则增加了自由贸易区国家内部的税收，它们可以将一个福利减少的自由贸易区转变为福利改善的自由贸易区。
We explore the new roles of rules of origin (ROO) when multinational enterprises (MNEs) manipulate their transfer prices to avoid a high corporate tax. The ROO under a free trade agreement (FTA) require exporters to identify the origin of exports to be eligible for a preferential tariff rate. We find that a value-added criterion of ROO restricts abusive transfer pricing by MNEs. Interestingly, an FTA with ROO can induce MNEs to shift profits from a low- to high-tax country. Because the ROO augment tax revenues inside FTA countries, they can transform a welfare-reducing FTA into a welfare-improving one.