Efficiency and truthfulness with Leontief preferences. A note on two-agent, two-good economies
Efficiency and truthfulness with Leontief preferences. A note on two-agent, two-good economies
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效率和真实性符合里昂惕夫的偏好。
DOI：
10.1007/s10058-003-0112-0
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发表时间：
2004
影响因子：
0.7
通讯作者：
Antonio Nicoló
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Antonio Nicoló
在交换经济中，代理人拥有有关其偏好的私人信息，策略证明和个人理性的社会选择功能通常效率不高。我们提供一个受限制的域，即由 Leontief 效用函数表示的偏好集，其中存在策略证明、有效且个体理性的机制。在两个主体、两个好的经济体中，我们能够提供更强劲的结果。我们描述了有效且个体理性的社会选择函数的特征，这些函数在真实的策略中完全可以实现。
In exchange economies where agents have private information about their preferences, strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions are in general not efficient. We provide a restricted domain, namely the set of preferences representable by Leontief utility functions, where there exist mechanisms which are strategy-proof, efficient and individually rational. In two-agent, two-good economies we are able to provide an even stronger result. We characterize the class of efficient and individually rational social choice functions, which are fully implementable in truthful strategies.