Paying for Public Inputs
Paying for Public Inputs
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支付公共投入
DOI：
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发表时间：
1985
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Mcmillan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Manning;J. Markusen;J. Mcmillan
对于公共消费品，通过林达尔定价可以达到帕累托最优均衡。这就要求每个消费者支付的价格与他从公共产品中获得的边际效用成正比。提供商品的边际成本等于边际收益的总和。有些公共产品是生产过程的投入，而不是消费品：灯塔就是一个例子。具有公共中间产品的经济的效率要求提供公共中间产品的边际成本等于其对企业的边际效益之和。通过与公共消费品的情况类比，林达尔定价似乎可以扩展到公共中间产品，要求企业按照这些产品对利润的边际贡献的比例支付。Agnar Sandmo（1972）明确地提出了凸技术。对于一类重要的生产函数所产生的非凸技术（用James米德（1952）的话来说，本质上是那些表现出“大气外部性”的技术），林达尔对这种公共投入的定价是不可行的。这里导出的主要结果是一个模拟
With public consumption goods, Pareto optimality can be achieved in equilibrium through Lindahl pricing. This requires that each consumer pays a price proportional to his marginal utility from the public good. The marginal cost of providing the good is then equated to the sum of the marginal benefits. Some public goods serve as inputs into production processes rather than as consumption goods: the lighthouse is an example. Efficiency in an economy with public intermediate goods requires that the marginal cost of providing them equals the sum of their marginal benefits to firms. By analogy with the case of public consumption goods, it might seem that Lindahl pricing can be extended to public intermediate goods, by requiring that firms pay in proportion to the marginal contribution of these goods to profits. Agnar Sandmo (1972) explicitly proposes this for convex technologies. For nonconvex technologies that arise with an important class of production functions (essentially those exhibiting "atmosphere externalities," in the phrase of James Meade, 1952), Lindahl pricing for such public inputs is infeasible. The principal result derived here is a sim