Metrics for Security and Performance in Low-Latency Anonymity Systems
Metrics for Security and Performance in Low-Latency Anonymity Systems
复制标题
低延迟匿名系统中的安全性和性能指标
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-540-70630-4_8
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Watson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Murdoch;R. Watson
在本文中，我们将探讨Tor等匿名网络的安全性和性能之间的权衡。使用路径妥协的概率作为衡量安全性的标准，我们探索了各种路径选择算法与Tor路径模拟器的行为。我们证明，假设的IP地址的相对费用和廉价的带宽打破，如果攻击者被允许购买访问僵尸网络，提供丰富的IP地址，但每个相对较差的对称带宽。我们进一步提出，通过网络发送的数据的预期延迟是一个有用的性能指标，显示它是如何计算的，并证明了反直觉的结果，Tor的当前路径选择方案，设计的性能，既表现良好，是良好的匿名存在的僵尸网络为基础的对手。
In this paper we explore the tradeoffs between security and performance in anonymity networks such as Tor. Using probability of path compromise as a measure of security, we explore the behaviour of various path selection algorithms with a Tor path simulator. We demonstrate that assumptions about the relative expense of IP addresses and cheapness of bandwidth break down if attackers are allowed to purchase access to botnets, giving plentiful IP addresses, but each with relatively poor symmetric bandwidth. We further propose that the expected latency of data sent through a network is a useful performance metric, show how it may be calculated, and demonstrate the counter-intuitive result that Tor's current path selection scheme, designed for performance, both performs well and is good for anonymity in the presence of a botnet-based adversary.