Epistemic injustice, children and mental illness
Epistemic injustice, children and mental illness
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DOI：
10.1136/medethics-2021-107329
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发表时间：
2021-11-01
影响因子：
4.1
通讯作者：
Harcourt, Edward
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Harcourt, Edward
认知（特别是证词）不公正的概念是最新的哲学工具，它试图理论化当临床医生不倾听心理健康服务使用者的意见时会出现什么问题，而当临床医生倾听时，什么会是正确的。该工具足以完成任务吗？有人认为，为了完全适用，这一概念需要进行一些调整，以便因偏见而被怀疑是其应用的一系列替代必要条件之一，而不是其本身的必要条件。有人认为，即使以这种方式调整，这个概念也不太适合迄今为止最努力应用的领域，即患有妄想症的成年患者的高度敏感病例。事实上，在这种情况下尝试应用它并不符合那些努力获得认可的服务用户的利益，因为倾听不仅仅是被相信。然而，这一概念被发现在服务使用者是儿童的许多情况下可以顺利应用，例如，在儿童对治疗效果的证词方面。建议进一步的研究将证明该概念在类似成人案例中的有用性。
The concept of epistemic (specifically testimonial) injustice is the latest philosophical tool with which to try to theorise what goes wrong when mental health service users are not listened to by clinicians, and what goes right when they are. Is the tool adequate to the task? It is argued that, to be applicable at all, the concept needs some adjustment so that being disbelieved as a result of prejudice is one of a family of alternative necessary conditions for its application, rather than a necessary condition all on its own. It is then argued that even once adjusted in this way, the concept does not fit well in the area where the biggest efforts have been made to apply it so far, namely the highly sensitive case of adult patients suffering from delusions. Indeed it does not serve the interests of service users struggling for recognition to try to apply it in this context, because there is so much more to being listened to than simply being believed. However, the concept is found to apply smoothly in many cases where the service users are children, for example, in relation to children's testimony on the efficacy of treatment. It is suggested that further research would demonstrate the usefulness of the concept in adult cases of a similar kind.