Communication and convention
Communication and convention
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沟通与会议
作者：
D. Davidson
习俗在我们的许多活动中都很明显，例如在玩塔罗牌时，在说话时，在吃饭时。在玩塔罗牌时，习俗是必不可少的，在吃东西时则不是。在解释什么是玩塔罗牌时，我们不能不考虑定义游戏的规则;在解释什么是吃时，不需要提到规则或惯例。言语是什么情况？习俗仅仅是方便或社会习俗，还是语言交流存在的必要条件？这个问题是微妙的，因为它涉及的不是言论受惯例约束这一主张的真实性，而是惯例在言论中的重要性和作用。这个问题可能是反事实的：是否可能有沟通的语言没有公约？根据大卫刘易斯的说法，“这是一种陈词滥调，只有哲学家才会梦想否认语言的惯例。当然，否认许多习俗都涉及言语是荒谬的，比如不管天气如何都说“早上好”;但这不是语言存在所依赖的那种习俗。毫无疑问，刘易斯脑子里想的是这样一种想法，即词语与其含义之间的联系是约定俗成的。也许只有哲学家会否认这一点;但如果是这样，原因可能是只有哲学家首先会说。显而易见的是，使用一个特定的声音来指代或表示它所做的事情是任意的，这已经是老生常谈了。但是，虽然传统的东西在某种意义上是任意的，但任意的东西不一定是传统的。在一个方面，当我们说什么是有意义的话语以及每一个实际的或潜在的话语意味着什么时，我们就完全描述了一种语言。但这样的描述假设我们已经知道话语具有特定意义是什么。在这个问题上，传统意义问题要求我们以一种启发性的方式将意义的概念与信仰、欲望、意图和目的联系起来。正是在语言意义与用非语言术语描述的人类态度和行为之间建立联系的过程中，约定俗成才得以发挥作用。和这里
Convention figures conspicuously in many of our activities, for example in playing tarot, in speaking, and in eating. In playing tarot, convention is essential, in eating it is not. In explaining what it is to play tarot, we could not leave out of account the rules that define the game; in explaining what it is to eat, no mention of rules or conventions needs to be made. What is the case with speech? Are conventions mere conveniences or social flourishes, or are they necessary to the existence of communication by language? The question is delicate because it concerns not the truth of the claim that speech is convention-bound, but the importance and role of convention in speech. The issue may be put counterfactually: could there be communication by language without convention? According to David Lewis, "I t is a platitude something only a philosopher would dream of denying that there are conventions of language." 1 Certainly it would be absurd to deny that many conventions involve speech, such as saying "Good morning" no matter what the weather is like; but this is not the sort of convention on which the existence of language depends. No doubt what Lewis has in mind is the idea that the Connection between words and what they mean is conventional. And perhaps only a philosopher would deny this; but if so, the reason may be that only a philosopher would say it in the first place. What is obvious enough to be a platitude is that the use of a particular sound to refer to, or mean, what it does is arbitrary. But while what is conventional is in some sense arbitrary, what is arbitrary is not necessarily conventional. In one respect we describe a language completely when we say what counts as a meaningful utterance and what each actual or potential utterance means. But such descriptions assume we already know what it is for an utterance to have a particular meaning. Light on this question the traditional problem of meaning requires us to connect the notion of meaning with beliefs, desires, intentions and purposes in an illuminating way. It is mainly in making the connection, or connections, between linguistic meaning and human attitudes and acts described in nonlinguistic terms that convention is asked to do its work. And here