Does venture capital syndication affect mergers and acquisitions?
Does venture capital syndication affect mergers and acquisitions?
复制标题
风险投资联合组织是否会影响并购？
DOI：
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101851
复制
发表时间：
2021
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Giang Nguyen and Le Vu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
秋森弘;南ホチョル;井尻裕之 地主敏樹;Giang Nguyen and Le Vu
我们发现，风险投资 (VC) 集团支持的目标可以获得更高的收购溢价，并花更多时间谈判交易条款。银团支持目标的收购者在收购公告前后获得的累计异常回报较低，但从长期来看，他们的表现优于个人支持目标。我们表明，风险投资联合组织通过在收购前组建规模更大、更独立的董事会，为创业公司创造价值。它还可以促进收购公司首席执行官和股东之间更好的激励协调。此外，财团支持的目标更喜欢以股票作为并购的支付方式。总的来说，我们表明风险投资联合组织可以为创业公司及其收购方创造长期价值。
We find that venture capital (VC) syndicate-backed targets receive higher acquisition premiums and spend more time negotiating transaction terms. The acquirers of syndicate-backed targets receive lower cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the acquisition announcement, but they outperform the individual-backed targets in the long-term. We show that VC syndication creates value for entrepreneurial firms by leading to larger and more independent boards of directors prior to acquisition. It also leads to better incentive alignment between the CEO and the shareholders of the acquiring firm. In addition, syndicate-backed targets prefer stock as the method of payment in mergers and acquisitions. Collectively, we show that VC syndication creates value for both entrepreneurial firms and their acquirers in the long-term.