Candidate Stability and Voting Correspondences
Candidate Stability and Voting Correspondences
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候选人稳定性和投票对应
DOI：
10.1007/s00355-006-0126-y
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发表时间：
2006
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Carmelo Rodríguez
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Carmelo Rodríguez
我们扩展Dutta等人的分析。(in Econometrica，69：1013-1038，2001）对多值环境的战略候选人。对于每个议程和选民对竞选候选人的偏好的每个简档，投票通信选择竞选候选人的集合。如果在所有其他潜在候选人竞选公职时，没有候选人有退出候选人资格的动机，则投票通信是候选人稳定的。在多值框架中，候选人退出的动机取决于候选人对集合的偏好。如果候选人不能投票，他们根据他们的预期效用条件下的一些先验概率评估比较候选人集，那么投票对应满足候选人稳定性和一致性当且仅当它是独裁的。如果概率评估被限制为均匀的，候选人对集合的偏好与leximin偏好一致，或者候选人可以投票，则得到可能性结果。
We extend the analysis of Dutta et al. (in Econometrica, 69:1013–1038, 2001) onstrategic candidacyto multivalued environments. For each agenda and each profile of voters’ preferences over running candidates, a voting correspondence selects set of running candidates. A voting correspondence is candidate stable if no candidate ever has an incentive to withdraw her candidacy when all other potential candidates run for office. In the multivalued framework, candidates’ incentives to withdraw depend on candidates’ preferences over sets. If candidates cannot vote and they compare sets of candidates according to their expected utility conditional on some prior probability assessment, then a voting correspondence satisfies candidate stability and unanimity if and only if it is dictatorial. If the probability assessments are restricted to be uniform, candidates’ preferences over sets are consistent with leximin preferences, or candidates can vote, then possibility results are obtained.