Understanding Felt Accountability The institutional antecedents of the felt accountability of agency-CEO's to central government
Understanding Felt Accountability The institutional antecedents of the felt accountability of agency-CEO's to central government
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理解责任感 机构首席执行官对中央政府的责任感的制度前因
DOI：
10.1111/gove.12547
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
2.9
通讯作者：
Schillemans T
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Schillemans T
关于自治公共机构的文献通常采用自上而下的方法，重点关注可以引导和控制这些机构的手段。这篇文章打开了机构的黑匣子，放大了他们的首席执行官和他们对层级问责制的看法。这篇文章的重点是感受到的问责制，表示管理人员的（a）期望必须解释实质性的决定被认为是（B）合法的上级部门和（c）有专业知识来评估这些决定。我们探讨了机构CEO的感受到的问责制及其制度的前身，在七个国家的调查相结合的公共管理和心理学的见解。我们自下而上的视角揭示了事实上的控制实践，而不是正式的机构特征和感觉到的机构首席执行官的责任之间的密切联系。我们认为，感受到的问责制是一个至关重要的齿轮调整问责制持有人的期望和CEO的行为。
The literature on autonomous public agencies often adopts a top‐down approach, focusing on the means with which those agencies can be steered and controlled. This article opens up the black box of the agencies and zooms in on their CEO's and their perceptions of hierarchical accountability. The article focuses on felt accountability, denoting the manager's (a) expectation to have to explain substantive decisions to a parent department perceived to be (b) legitimate and (c) to have the expertise to evaluate those decisions. We explore felt accountability of agency‐CEO's and its institutional antecedents with a survey in seven countries combining insights from public administration and psychology. Our bottom‐up perspective reveals close connections between de facto control practices rather than formal institutional characteristics and felt accountability of CEO's of agencies. We contend that felt accountability is a crucial cog aligning accountability holders' expectations and behaviors by CEO's.