Legal enforcement against illegal imitation in developing countries
Legal enforcement against illegal imitation in developing countries
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发展中国家打击非法仿制的法律执法
DOI：
10.1007/s00712-015-0436-6
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Keishun Suzuki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Keishun Suzuki;Keishun Suzuki
本研究采用南北质量阶梯模型考察了发展中国家知识产权执法对模仿、创新、经济增长和福利的影响。与现有研究不同，本研究通过将非法模仿和扣押活动纳入模型，明确区分了知识产权保护和知识产权执法。四个主要结果是，首先，在南方，较高的缉获率并不一定会降低仿冒率。其次，较高的缴获率并不总能鼓励朝鲜的创新。第三，尽管提高经济增长需要足够高的没收率，但这样的政策改革将恶化南北双方的福利。最后，与扣押不同，禁止从南方进口非法仿制品总是降低非法仿制品的水平。
This study investigates the effect of intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement in a developing country on imitation, innovation, economic growth, and welfare using a North–South quality ladder model. Unlike existing studies, this study explicitly distinguishes IPR protection and IPR enforcement by incorporating illegal imitation and seizure activity into the model. The four main results are, first, a higher seizure rate does not always decrease imitation rate in the South. Second, a higher seizure rate does not always encourage innovation in the North. Third, although a sufficiently high seizure rate is required to enhance economic growth, such a policy reform would deteriorates welfare in both the North and South. Finally, unlike seizure, prohibiting imports of illegal imitations from the South always lowers illegal imitation.