Contracting for Collaborative Services
Contracting for Collaborative Services
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DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.1100.1146
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发表时间：
2008-11
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
G. Roels;U. Karmarkar;Scott M. Carr
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
G. Roels;U. Karmarkar;Scott M. Carr
在本文中，我们分析了协作服务中出现的合同问题，例如咨询，财务计划和信息技术外包。特别是，我们研究合同类型的选择是如何在固定费用，时间和基于绩效的合同中的选择 - 由服务环境特征驱动。我们发现，当服务输出对供应商的努力更加敏感时，固定费用合同是优先于性能的，当产出对买家的努力更加敏感时，时间和物质合同是最佳的，而基于绩效的合同则是最佳的。当输出对买方和供应商的输入同样敏感时，占主导地位。我们还讨论了这些合同的绩效如何受到产出不确定性，过程改进机会以及多个买家和供应商参与联合生产过程的影响。我们的模型强调了在协作服务环境中选择合同的基础的权衡，并确定了提高合同效率的服务过程设计变化。
In this paper, we analyze the contracting issues that arise in collaborative services, such as consulting, financial planning, and information technology outsourcing. In particular, we investigate how the choice of contract type---among fixed-fee, time-and-materials, and performance-based contracts---is driven by the service environment characteristics. We find that fixed-fee contracts contingent on performance are preferred when the service output is more sensitive to the vendor's effort, that time-and-materials contracts are optimal when the output is more sensitive to the buyer's effort, and that performance-based contracts dominate when the output is equally sensitive to both the buyer's and the vendor's inputs. We also discuss how the performance of these contracts is affected with output uncertainty, process improvement opportunities, and the involvement of multiple buyers and vendors in the joint-production process. Our model highlights the trade-offs underlying the choice of contracts in a collaborative service environment and identifies service process design changes that improve contract efficiency.