Intrinsic Motivation and Optimal Incentive Contracts
Intrinsic Motivation and Optimal Incentive Contracts
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内在动机和最优激励契约
DOI：
10.2307/3087479
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Kevin C. Murdock
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Kevin C. Murdock
我研究的作用，内在动机的最优激励合同。代理人致力于产生既有财务回报又有内在价值的项目。在中性环境中，内在动机对努力的负效用没有直接影响，静态契约不受内在动机的影响。与此相反，公司的利润从一个隐含的合同增加的程度，代理人的内在动机，这表明，隐含的合同和内在动机是互补的。结果进一步扩展到考虑多个隐式合同和产品市场策略的作用。
I study the role of intrinsic motivation on optimal incentive contracts. Agents engage in efforts to generate projects with both financial return and intrinsic value to the agent. In a neutral environment, where intrinsic motivation has no direct effect on the disutility of effort, static contracts are unaffected by intrinsic motivation. In contrast, the firm's profits from an implicit contract are increasing in the degree to which the agent is intrinsically motivated, showing that implicit contracts and intrinsic motivation are complements. The results are further extended to consider the role of multiple implicit contracts and product market strategy.