Are Overconfident CEOs Better Leaders? Evidence from Stakeholder Commitments
Are Overconfident CEOs Better Leaders? Evidence from Stakeholder Commitments
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2648601
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发表时间：
2017-12
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Kenny Phua;T. M. Tham;Chishen Wei
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Kenny Phua;T. M. Tham;Chishen Wei
我们发现有证据表明，过于自信的首席执行官(CEO)的领导会诱使利益相关者采取有助于领导者愿景的行动。通过故意过度暴露于公司的特殊风险，过于自信的首席执行官们对公司的前景表现出强烈的信心。这种信念吸引了供应商，而不是公司可观察到的扩张性企业活动。过于自信的CEO会导致更多的供应商承诺，包括更大的特定于关系的投资和更长的关系持续时间。过于自信的CEO还会导致更强烈的劳动承诺，因为员工的离职率较低，福利计划中公司股票的持有量更大。
We find evidence that the leadership of overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs) induces stakeholders to take actions that contribute to the leader's vision. By being intentionally overexposed to the idiosyncratic risk of their firms, overconfident CEOs exhibit a strong belief in their firms’ prospects. This belief attracts suppliers beyond the firm's observable expansionary corporate activities. Overconfident CEOs induce more supplier commitments including greater relationship-specific investment and longer relationship duration. Overconfident CEOs also induce stronger labor commitments as employees exhibit lower turnover rates and greater ownership of company stock in benefit plans.