The quantity flexibility contract and supplier-customer incentives
The quantity flexibility contract and supplier-customer incentives
复制标题
DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.45.10.1339
复制
发表时间：
1999-10-01
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
Tsay, AA
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Tsay, AA
考虑由两个独立代理、供应商（例如制造商）及其客户（例如零售商）组成的供应链，后者又服务于不确定的市场需求。为了协调制造/采购时间滞后与及时响应市场的需求，此类供应链通常必须根据预测而非实际需求将资源投入到生产数量中。客户通常会提供其预期采购的计划预测，这不需要承诺。由于受益于生产过剩，同时不承担直接成本，客户有动机在最终购买较少数量之前进行最初的超额预测。供应商必须在其生产数量决策中预见到这种行为。这种个体理性行为导致供应链效率低下。本文对双方的激励进行建模，找出效率低下的原因并提出补救措施。我们特别关注数量灵活性 (QF) 合同，该合同将客户承诺采购不少于低于预测一定比例的承诺与供应商保证交付最多高于预测一定比例的承诺结合起来。在一定条件下，该方法可以分配市场需求不确定性的成本，从而引导个体激励的供应商和客户达到系统范围内的最优结果。我们描述了 QF 合同对双方以及整个供应链的行为和绩效的影响。
Consider a supply chain consisting of two independent agents, a supplier (e.g., a manufacturer) and its customer (e.g., a retailer), the latter in turn serving an uncertain market demand. To reconcile manufacturing/procurement time lags with a need for timely response to the market, such supply chains often must commit resources to production quantities based on forecasted rather than realized demand.The customer typically provides a planning forecast of its intended purchase, which does not entail commitment. Benefiting from overproduction while not bearing the immediate costs, the customer has incentive to initially overforecast before eventually purchasing a lesser quantity. The supplier must in turn anticipate such behavior in its production quantity decision. This individually rational behavior results in an inefficient supply chain.This paper models the incentives of the two parties, identifying causes of inefficiency and suggesting remedies. Particular attention is given to the Quantity Flexibility (QF) contract, which couples the customer's commitment to purchase no less than a certain percentage below the forecast with the supplier's guarantee to deliver up to a certain percentage above. Under certain conditions, this method can allocate the costs of market demand uncertainty so as to lead the individually motivated supplier and customer to the systemwide optimal outcome. We characterize the implications of QF contracts for the behavior and performance of both parties, and the supply chain as a whole.