How Can International Organizations Shape National Welfare States?
How Can International Organizations Shape National Welfare States?
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国际组织如何塑造国民福利国家？
DOI：
10.1177/0010414005285756
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发表时间：
2007
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
K. Linos
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
K. Linos
国际组织如何塑造国家福利国家？答案取决于各国政府为什么要遵守国际组织的授权。执行理论预测，国家的政策偏好决定执行，而管理理论将不遵守归因于国家的能力限制和制度。本文从这些理论中得出了具体的遵守机制，并通过一个新的量化数据集和希腊和西班牙的定性案例研究来检验欧盟社会政策指令的执行情况。偏好与社会政策指令背道而驰的国家，特别是缺乏相关早期国家立法的国家，以及劳动力成本较低的国家，会推迟实施。然而，由于能力限制造成的延误要大得多--贫穷的官僚机构、联邦州、联合政府和议会如果没有为指令做好准备，就会造成巨大的延误。这些发现表明，国际组织可以通过将争论的轴心从左到右重新定位为超国家-国家以下的方式来塑造国家社会政策。
How can international organizations shape national welfare states? The answer depends on why national governments comply with international organization mandates. Enforcement theories predict that states' policy preferences determine implementation, whereas managerial theories attribute noncompliance to states' capability limitations and to institutions. This article derives specific compliance mechanisms from these theories and examines the implementation of European Union social policy directives through a new quantitative data set and qualitative case studies of Greece and Spain. Countries whose preferences diverge from social policy directives, specifically countries lacking related early national legislation, and countries with low labor costs, delay implementation. However, delays from capability limitations are much greater—poor bureaucracies, federal states, coalition governments, and parliaments that do not prepare for directives cause big delays. These findings suggest that international organizations can shape national social policies by reorienting the axes of contestation from left-right to supranational-subnational.
DOI：
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发表时间：
1972
期刊：
--
影响因子：
--
作者：
D. Cox
通讯作者：
D. Cox