The Strategic Role of Party Ideology When Voters Are Uncertain about How the Economy Works
The Strategic Role of Party Ideology When Voters Are Uncertain about How the Economy Works
复制标题
当选民不确定经济如何运作时，政党意识形态的战略作用
DOI：
10.2307/2944707
复制
发表时间：
1994
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
J. Roemer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Roemer
一个连续的选民群体，以收入为指标，对经济结果有偏好。两个政党各自代表特定选民群体的利益：富人和穷人。政党/候选人提出政策，例如税收政策，其中税收为公共产品提供资金。选民对经济理论不确定，经济理论是将政策映射为经济结果的功能。各党派也为经济理论争论不休。每个选民对可能的经济理论都有一个先验概率分布；在各政党宣布各自的经济理论后，每个选民都会根据这些理论构建一个后验分布。假设选民不确定政府将税收收入转化为公共利益的效率。在合理的假设下，代表富人的政党认为政府效率低下，而代表穷人的政党则持相反的观点。看似自由主义和保守主义的意识形态观点在选举游戏中只是很好的策略。
A continuum of voters, indexed by income, have preferences over economic outcomes. Two political parties each represent the interests of given constituencies of voters: the rich and the poor. Parties/candidates put forth policies—for instance, tax policy, where taxes finance a public good. Voters are uncertain about the theory of the economy, the function that maps policies into economic outcomes. Parties argue, as well, for theories of the economy. Each voter has a prior probability distribution over possible theories of the economy; after parties announce their theories of the economy, each voter constructs an a posteriori distribution over such theories. Suppose that voters are unsure how efficiently the government converts tax revenues into the public good. Under reasonable assumptions the party representing the rich argues that the government is very inefficient and the party representing the poor argues the opposite. What appear as liberal and conservative ideological views emerge as simply good strategies in the electoral game.