Board Governance and Corporate Performance
Board Governance and Corporate Performance
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DOI：
10.1111/jbfa.12271
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发表时间：
2017-08
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Amama Shaukat;G. Trojanowski
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Amama Shaukat;G. Trojanowski
我们研究英国上市公司的董事会和企业绩效的监控能力之间的联系。我们还研究了企业如何利用自愿治理制度提供的灵活性来做出治理选择。我们发现，我们构建的董事会治理指数和公司经营业绩之间存在很强的正相关关系。我们的研究结果意味着，坚持董事会相关的建议，英国公司治理守则加强了董事会的监督能力，可能有助于减轻代理问题，但投资者不重视它相应的。此外，在之前的英国调查结果表明，有效地采用代码的建议，我们发现，公司有时使用代码的灵活性机会主义，旨在降低董事会的监测能力，这是随后的表现不佳。这一发现质疑了英国和世界上许多国家所遵循的治理监管自愿方法的有效性。本文受版权保护。版权所有
We examine the link between the monitoring capacity of the board and corporate performance of UK listed firms. We also investigate how firms use the flexibility offered by the voluntary governance regime to make governance choices. We find a strong positive association between the board governance index we construct and firm operating performance. Our results imply that adherence to the board-related recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance Code strengthens the board's monitoring capacity, potentially helping mitigate agency problems, but that investors do not value it correspondingly. Moreover, in contrast to prior UK findings suggesting efficient adoption of Code recommendations, we find that firms at times use the Code flexibility opportunistically, aiming to decrease the monitoring capacity of the board, which is followed by subsequent underperformance. This finding questions the effectiveness of the voluntary approach to governance regulation followed in the UK as in many countries around the world. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved