Physician reimbursement, time-consistency and the quality of care [Ärztevergütung, Zeitkonsistenz und die Qualität medizinischer Leistungen]
Physician reimbursement, time-consistency and the quality of care [Ärztevergütung, Zeitkonsistenz und die Qualität medizinischer Leistungen]
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医生报销、时间一致性和护理质量
DOI：
10.1628/0932456032974853
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Nuscheler
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Nuscheler
本文采用横向和纵向分化模型研究了价格调控下医患关系中医生提供质量的动机。如果价格是唯一的调节变量，社会计划者就不能实施最优政策。此外，次优政策是时间不一致的。在没有承诺的情况下，在游戏中可以观察到过多的进入和最优效率的总质量规定。允许医生在价格上竞争并不能解决承诺问题，因为竞争性解决方案与时间一致的结果是一致的。在中位选民均衡中，时间一致性问题更为严重。
We use a model of horizontal and vertical differentiation to study physicians’ incentives to provide quality in the physician-patient relationship under price regulation. If the price is the only regulatory variable, the social planner cannot implement the first-best policy. Moreover, the second-best policy is time inconsistent. Excess entry and firstbest efficient total quality provision is observed in the game without commitment. Allowing physicians to compete in prices does not solve the commitment problem since the competitive solution coincides with the time consistent outcome. In the median voter equilibrium the time consistency problem is more severe.