Truth, Envy, and Truthful Market Clearing Bundle Pricing
Truth, Envy, and Truthful Market Clearing Bundle Pricing
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真相、嫉妒和真实的市场出清捆绑定价
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_9
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Svetlana Olonetsky
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. Cohen;M. Feldman;A. Fiat;Haim Kaplan;Svetlana Olonetsky
我们给出了一类非平凡的估价函数，我们给出了拍卖，是有效的，真实的和羡慕的自由。我们给出了有趣的类的估价，可以设计这样的拍卖。令人惊讶的是，我们还表明，这些估值的微小修改导致不可能的结果，其中最令人惊讶的是，对于一个自然类的估值，不能实现效率，真实性，嫉妒自由，个人理性，并没有积极的transfers.We还表明，这样的拍卖也意味着一个真实的机制计算捆绑价格（“收缩包装”捆绑的项目），清除市场。这扩大了真实市场清算价格机制存在的估值类别。
We give a non-trivial class of valuation functions for which we give auctions that are efficient, truthful and envy-free.We give interesting classes of valuations for which one can design such auctions. Surprisingly, we also show that minor modifications to these valuations lead to impossibility results, the most surprising of which is that for a natural class of valuations, one cannot achieve efficiency, truthfulness, envy freeness, individual rationality, and no positive transfers.We also show that such auctions also imply a truthful mechanism for computing bundle prices (“shrink wrapped” bundles of items), that clear the market. This extends the class of valuations for which truthful market clearing prices mechanisms exist.